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We analyze how a country’s political institutions affect oil production within its borders.  We 
find a pronounced negative relationship between political openness and volatility in oil 
production, with democratic regimes exhibiting less volatility than more autocratic regimes.   
This relationship holds across a number of robustness checks including using different measures 
of political conditions, instrumenting for political conditions and using several measures of 
production volatility.  Political openness also affects other oil market outcomes, including total 
production as a share of reserves.  Our findings have implications both for interpreting the role of 
institutions in explaining differences in macroeconomic development and for understanding 
world oil markets. 
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I. Introduction 
Development levels vary considerably across countries, and explaining why these 
differences exist is one of the central questions in economics.  While scholars have long 
hypothesized that political institutions play an important role (see, e.g., North 1981), a recent 
literature has made progress identifying a causal impact of institutions on cross-country 
differences in macroeconomic outcomes.
1  Still, the mechanisms by which specific institutions 
affect economic outcomes remain a “’black box’” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001 – 
hereafter AJR –  p.1395).
2 
This paper focuses on the influence of institutions on one particular industry: crude oil 
production.  We document a pronounced negative effect of good political conditions on volatility 
in oil production, and this result is robust to using several different measures of political 
conditions.  We also address the potential endogeneity of political structure, as suggested by the 
literature on the “resource curse.”  We estimate two-stage least-squares regressions where we 
instrument for recent political institutions with both institutions before oil was commercialized 
and, following AJR, settler mortality.  We find that the negative relationship persists in these 
specifications.
3  We also evaluate whether other macroeconomic differences across countries 
affect oil market outcomes, including financial openness and legal formalism.  None of these 
factors has a significant effect on volatility once we control for institutions. 
It is important to acknowledge that a country’s oil production may not necessarily be 
inefficient if it is volatile.  To allow for this, we also construct volatility measures that control for 
market factors which should drive changes in a country’s oil output, and our results are robust to 
using these alternative measures.
4 
Ideally, we would also like to measure oil output controlling for the natural resources 
available to the country, as this is analogous to studies that examine factors contributing to 
differences in economic development.  With this goal in mind, we also examine the link between 
                                                 
1 See Barro (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Perrson and Tabellini (2003), and 
Mulligan, Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2004) for varying perspectives on the influence of political institutions on 
economic outcomes. 
2 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provides a peek inside the box, finding evidence that firms in countries with poor 
political institutions are more likely to report concerns about government corruption, including “additional 
payments” for government services, and concerns about unpredictable government regulation. 
3  Albouy (2008) critiques the settler mortality instruments developed by AJR.  Our results are robust to excluding 
the potentially problematic observations. 
4 Existing work considers the effect of political institutions on macroeconomic volatility.  See, for example, 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003).   2
political institutions and a country’s average production as a share of its proven reserves.  We 
find that countries with better political institutions produce a higher share, although we devote 
less attention to these results since the data on reserves are self-reported in some cases and could 
be systematically biased.
   Finally, we show that political institutions lead to volatility in the 
number of active wells, suggesting that the volatility is less likely to be driven by physical 
characteristics of a country’s oil fields.  
Oil production is a particularly convenient lens with which to view the possible 
microeconomic foundations for macroeconomic outcomes as it is a commodity sold on a world 
market.  This means that production decisions within a country should be driven by world 
demand and not local macroeconomic conditions.  Was this not the case, our results would be 
less interesting as they could simply reflect the effect of political institutions on overall 
macroeconomic activity.  Since oil demand is worldwide, however, we can be confident that our 
results reflect supply-side factors and not demand-driven output volatility. 
Another reason that oil is well-suited to this analysis is that the unit of output (a barrel of 
oil) is of essentially homogenous quality and is consistently measured across countries.  Finally, 
rich data are available on oil production and its determinants, such as reserves and the number of 
wells. 
By documenting that political institutions affect outcomes in a particular industry, our 
results provide insight on how institutions affect aggregate economic output.  For example, they 
suggest that while political institutions may work by influencing structural factors, such as by 
promoting a well-developed commercial sector or less reliance on agriculture (see, e.g., Duarte 
and Restuccia, 2010), these cannot be the only mechanisms at play as institutions have effects 
within an industry.  Although our results cannot address this hypothesis directly, they are 
consistent with the idea that well-functioning political institutions support efficient investment in 
crude oil production. 
Our results also provide insight on world oil markets.  Like many energy markets, oil 
markets are characterized by extremely inelastic short-run supply and demand, meaning that 
even small fluctuations in either can lead to large swings in price.  While much has been written 
about how systematic shifts in oil demand or supply affect prices (see, for example, Hamilton 
(2009) and Kilian (2009)), less is understood about the underlying determinants of short-run 
changes in supply.   3
Our results imply that political institutions in the countries endowed with oil reserves 
affect the volatility, and perhaps the level, of its production.  To the extent countries with poor 
political conditions will have less stable production of other natural resources, our results suggest 
a useful metric for comparing different energy sources.  As U.S. policymakers attempt to drive 
shifts to new, alternative energy technologies, it is useful to be able to make these comparisons.  
To explore the implications of our results for world oil markets, we construct annual, 
worldwide statistics that summarize the political institutions of oil-producing regimes.  
Generally, our indexes depict a reduction in the political conditions of oil producing countries 
between 1965 and 1978, followed by an increase that peaks sometime in the late 1990s or early 
2000s, depending on which index is considered.  In recent years most of the indexes show a 
modest decline starting around 2003. 
We next decompose the measures into “production share” and “internal conditions” 
indexes to show how changes in the aggregate measures are driven by changes across countries 
in their share of world oil production and changes within countries in political conditions.  In the 
early part of our sample, changes in oil political conditions were mainly driven by changes in the 
production share, as Middle Eastern countries accounted for a larger and larger share of total 
production.  Recent trends, however, appear to be driven by changes in internal conditions in 
addition to changes in the location of oil production. 
We show that the higher the share of oil coming from countries with poor political 
conditions in any given year, as measured by the decomposed “production index,” the higher is 
the volatility of oil prices in that year.  Within-country changes in political conditions, as 
measured by the decomposed “internal conditions index,” if anything have the opposite effect on 
oil price volatility, suggesting that it may take time before short-run changes in political 
conditions impact oil production. 
While short-run production volatility within one country’s borders may be quickly 
counteracted by adjustments in other countries so that any resulting price volatility will be short-
lived, there are reasons to be concerned about the volatility.  For one, price volatility makes 
business planning difficult and raises the cost of hedging risk.  It is particularly difficult for 
energy-dependent industries such as the airlines and automakers.  It also raises concerns for   4
many that speculation is contributing to price volatility and spikes causing many to call for 
tighter regulation of energy markets.
5 
The next section of the paper presents a model that helps elucidate the mechanisms by 
which political conditions might affect oil markets.  Section III presents our main empirical 
findings, documenting the negative relationship between political conditions and oil market 
volatility.  Section IV interprets our findings and analyzes their implications for price volatility 
in world oil markets.  We also discuss why our findings probably do not support an “energy-
security” based argument for government intervention in energy markets.  We conclude in 
section V with some thoughts on the lessons to be drawn from this analysis as well as possible 
future extensions of this research agenda. 
II.  Background and Theory 
  In this paper we seek to identify the role that political conditions play in driving the 
volatility of oil production.  While a considerable literature exists on the causal relationship 
between a country’s oil wealth, or wealth from other natural resources, and political governance 
(the “resource curse” literature), there has been little focus on the role governance plays in 
affecting supply.   We discuss the resource curse literature in this section both to distinguish our 
paper from that line of research and to motivate the econometric strategy we use in the next 
section. 
  A number of papers have analyzed the relationship between a country’s resource wealth 
and various economic and political outcomes, including slower economic growth and 
development, conflict, and corruption.  We focus on the subset of papers that argue that "oil and 
mineral wealth tends to make states less democratic" (Ross (2001), p. 328).  Ross (2001) 
identifies three causal mechanisms: governments keep tax rates low and spending high to 
dampen support for democracy (a rentier effect); they spend money on police to repress dissent 
(a repression effect); and they fail to develop a modern economy with industrial and service jobs 
thereby preventing the rise of a middle class that might demand greater voice in government (a 
modernization effect).  Haber and Menaldo (2008) find support for a resource curse of the sort 
articulated by Ross in simple pooled time-series cross-section regressions but they find the 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of fixed effects.  See also the recent empirical analysis by 
                                                 
5  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission announced plans to consider placing limits on the trading behavior 
of financial investors in futures markets for energy products.  The CFTC opened hearings in July 2009 to consider 
how this might be best accomplished.  See Andrews (2009).   5
Wacziarg (2009).   For our purposes, these three papers (and others such as Smith (2004), 
Basedau and Lacher (2006), Tsui (2008), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009)) highlight the point 
that we cannot treat political institutions as exogenous in any analysis of the role political 
conditions play in affecting oil supply, and they motivate our choice of instruments for a 
country’s political conditions. 
  Turning to the affect of institutions on energy markets, Bohn and Deacon (2000) consider 
how ownership risk affects the exploitation of natural resources in countries.  They find that 
higher ownership risk decreases oil drilling and oil production whereas higher risk increases 
deforestation.  Ownership risk affects oil and forestry differently due to differential capital 
intensity.  While ownership risk encourages more rapid exploitation to extract resources before 
assets are (potentially) expropriated by the government, capital investment required to extract 
resources is also discouraged.  Since oil production is relatively capital intensive (compared to 
forestry) this investment effect offsets the production effect.  Our paper differs from Bohn and 
Deacon in several important respects.  First, while they interpret weak institutions as indicative 
of “ownership risk,” in one specification, we include a variable that measures expropriation 
events in addition to the political conditions variable.  The results of this specification suggest 
that political conditions affect oil production more through other channels (e.g., government 
pressures to pursue nonmarket goals) than through expropriation risk, although this is based on 
only one, perhaps blunt, measure of ownership risk.  Second, we treat governance institutions as 
endogenous and instrument for them in our empirical analysis. 
A.  Model Setup 
    We consider a simple model that illustrates the relationship between political structure 
and production volatility.  We take as our point of departure the model of Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2008) which describes the relationship between political and economic institutions.  
There are two political groups, an elite (E) with ME members and citizens (C) with MC >ME 
members.  Members of each group wish to maximize the present discounted value of 
consumption over an infinite horizon, ∑
t
t
tc β , where β  is a discount factor common to all and 
ct is consumption for an individual in period t.   
  Each period the groups struggle for control of the government.   The group in power 
controls economic resources in a country and wishes to maximize economic rents for itself.  In   6
particular, the government controls a nationalized oil sector and receives the revenue from oil 
sales.
6 
  We model political institutions as a state variable in a Markov model in which economic 
decisions along with citizen mobilization affect the probability of future political institutions.  
Thus there is an interplay between political institutions and economic outcomes. 
  A state variable s indicates whether the political regime is a democracy (state D) or 
autocracy (state A).  Which state the regime is in depends on the outcome of a struggle between 
citizens and the elite as described below.    
  As discussed below all decisions made in a given time period affect only that period with 
the exception of the value of the political state variable which sets the regime type for the 
following period.  Thus, in the discussion below we ignore time subscripts as all decisions relate 
to the current period (except where specifically noted otherwise). 
1.  Oil Production and Revenue Distribution 
  The government controls oil production in a country and must decide investment levels 
for production infrastructure (broadly defined as described below) and accrue rents for itself.  
For simplicity assume that oil production is the only source of revenue for the government.  Each 
period the group controlling the government invests K in the sector financed by a lump-sum tax 
paid by all residents of the country.  This includes spending on new capital and maintenance of 
existing capital as well as training of workers and managers.  It could also include spending to 
hire higher quality managers.  Higher levels of K reduce the probability of oil production 
disruptions.
7    Capital is fully depreciated in one period of the model.  
  An autocratic regime may also have a greater ability to monitor and stifle political dissent 
that could take the form of activities that reduce oil supply (Ross's Repression Effect).  This 
could include sabotage of capital infrastructure as well as labor slowdowns among the 
workforce.
8   Alternatively, democratic governments provide additional outlets for dissent that 
mean workers need not sabotage energy capital to be heard by political leaders. 
                                                 
6  The model could be extended to allow for a capitalist economic system with corporate ownership of natural 
resources.  In that case, tax and royalty policy would be potential instruments to extract oil rents. 
7  We ignore the possibility of foreign investment in the domestic oil sector.  This would provide another channel of 
potential oil production volatility.  Weak property rights that may be more likely in a less open political environment 
will deter investment.   
8  Nigerian rebels have disrupted oil production as noted elsewhere in our paper.  Venezuelan oil workers went on 
strike in protest of decisions taken by Hugo Chavez in 2002.     7
  Finally production disruptions can occur unexpectedly and for reasons unrelated to fiscal 
decisions made by the government.  Specifically we assume that the value of oil production (R) 
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* is a latent variable defined as 
(2)  ε δ α + ⋅ − − = A I K y
* . 
In equation (2) δ is a measure of an autocratic government's ability to monitor and deter activities 
that could disrupt production when s = A (IA is an indicator variable equal to 1 when s = A and 
zero otherwise).  We allow δ to be negative given the possibility that disruptive activities under 
autocracy more than offset the government's ability to monitor and deter those activities.  As we 
shall see below, the sign and magnitude of δ have no bearing on the degree of production 
volatility.   Finally ε is a random variable drawn from a density function f(ε ) and cumulative 
distribution function F(ε ).  We assume that P(R=RH) = P( 0
* ≤ y)  is high so that increased 
volatility is associated with higher values of y
*.  Higher values of K then are associated with 
lower production volatility.   
  Oil revenues are received by members of the class that controls government.  Thus in 
political state A, members of the elite share oil revenues each receiving R/ME.  In democracy (D), 
citizens each receive R/MC.   
2.  Political Struggle 
  The two groups engage in a political struggle for control of the government.  We assume 
that a more democratic political structure can make it more possible to engage in public 
organizing to preserve democratic institutions.
9  In addition, the ability to mobilize and coalesce 
opposition to a regime and force an opening of political institutions has a random component 
(see Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a full discussion of the forces driving regime transition).  
                                                 
9   Persistence of democracy is discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and the subject of analysis by Perrson 
and Tabellini (2009) who provide a theoretical justification for persistence as well as empirical support for the 
proposition.   8
Activities that lead to potential change in political institutions occur at the end of the current 
period and determine political institutions for the following period.
10   










1 s P D
s P A
s  
where s1 is the political state in the following period and 
(4)   η π + ⋅ = D I s P ) (  
The parameter π   measures the greater ability of citizens to mobilize for more democratic 
institutions if the current regime is democratic (ID equals one when the political state is D and 
zero otherwise).  The random variable η captures the stochastic nature of the public's ability to 
coalesce its opposition to the elite and is drawn from the density function g(η) with cumulative 
distribution function G(η).  We assume that ε and ηare independent random variables (though 
this could be relaxed).
11 
  As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) the winners of the political struggle choose the 
political regime for the following period.  The elite will choose an autocracy since this increases 
the likelihood of their obtaining oil production revenues while citizens will choose democracy.   
3.  Timing of Events 
  Events occur in the following sequence. 
•  The political state  {} D A s , ∈  is given exogenously based on actions taken last period.   
•  Knowing s, the current government chooses K, the investment in the oil sector for the 
current period (first stage decision).   
•  A draw is taken from the density function f and oil revenues are realized. 
•  A draw is taken from the density function g.  Based on the draw, either the elite or 
citizens take control of the government.  They choose the political regime for the 
following period.  Oil revenues accrue to the political class now in control of 
government. 
                                                 
10   We have also considered a model in which citizens and members of the elite can invest in de facto power that 
affects the probability of regime change.   The model is considerably more complicated but does not provide 
additional insight. 
11   We have also constructed a model in which economic agents may invest in de facto power to increase the 
probability that their group will win the political struggle.  As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), it is never optimal 
for citizens to invest in de facto power.  The resulting solution is more complicated and does not provide clear 
results on conditions for higher or lower production volatility under either regime.   9
B.  Solving the Model 
  Recall that the decision over the investment level is made by the group in power at the 
beginning of the period.  Define V
E(s) as the value function for a representative member of the 
elite when the political state equals  { } D A s , ∈ .  Similarly V
C(s) is the value function for a 
representative citizen given state s.  Thus a representative member of the elite chooses K in a 
non-democracy to maximize: 
(5)   ) , ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( L H
C E
E R A K F R A K F
M M
K
A V ψ δ α ψ δ α + − + + +
+
− =  













Δ + = , v = H, L and   is the 
difference in the value function for a representative member of the elite when the political state 
shifts from democracy to autocracy .  The function ψ  measures the expected net benefit to a 
member of the elite of oil revenue conditional on oil production.  Ex post benefits will depend on 
the outcome after the political struggle and oil investment is undertaken.  First order conditions 
for K(A) (i.e., K in the autocratic state) are given by  
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where ΔR = RH – RL.   Equation (6) holds as an equality if K(A) > 0.  We will assume positive 
values for K in the analysis below.  Second order conditions require 
(7)   0 ) ) ( ( ' ≤ +δ α A K f . 
Assuming an interior solution 
(8)   () ( )
1
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Investment in oil capital rises with the expected net gain from oil production rising from RL to 
RH.   
  In democracy a representative citizen chooses the level of oil investment to maximize: 
(9)   ) , ( )) ( 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( L H
C E
C R D K F R D K F
M M
K
D V ψ α ψ α − + +
+
− =    10
where  () () () ) ( 1 ) , ( D V
M
R




v β π β π ψ + − − + Δ − − =  is the expected net benefit to a 
representative citizen of oil production conditional on Rv production levels and 
) ( ) ( N V D V V
C C C − = Δ , the expected net gain in utility to a representative citizen from shifting 
from a non-democracy to democracy.   
  First order conditions are 
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Second order conditions are 
(11)   0 )) ( ( ' ≤ D K f α . 
Assuming an interior solution,  
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  The relation between production volatility and political structure is a complex one.  We 
first note that an improvement in the ability to monitor and deter oil production disruption in a 
non-democratic regime() 0 > Δδ  has no effect on the equilibrium level of production volatility.  
To see this note that the right hand side of equation (8) is unaffected by a change in δ.  Thus 
δ α + ) (A K  is unaffected by a change in δ.  Increases in δ are offset by reductions in K(A)  
leaving production volatility unchanged. 
  Oil production is more volatile as the probability of disruption rises which in turn is 
related to the amount of capital investment.  The model suggests several channels through which 
the political state can affect investment (and possibly production volatility).  They include 1) 
regime specific ability to monitor and deter production disruption activities (δ) as discussed 
above; 2) the extent of oil revenue losses due to disruption ( R Δ ); and 3) citizen organizing gains 
when political state equals D that affect optimal oil revenue sharing (π ). 
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Assuming the second order conditions for investment hold as a strict inequality, this will occur 









Equation (14) can be re-written as 
(15)   ) | ( ) | ( 1 1 A A s P
M
M
D D s P
E
C = > = . 
In other words production volatility under autocratic governments is more volatile if democracy 
is sufficiently more persistent than non-democracies.  This condition is consistent with the 
empirical findings of Perrson and Tabellini (2009) that democratic institutions contribute to a 
consolidation of democratic institutions across countries.   
  Our model provides some insight into the forces affecting oil production volatility and 
provides a theoretical link between political structure and economic outcomes in this industry.  
We turn next to an analysis of oil production data and political structure as an initial step to 
developing a deeper understanding of this relationship.   In the analysis below, we test 
empirically whether in fact oil production volatility is higher in non-democracies than 
democracies. 
III. Empirical  Analysis 
  We analyze the empirical relationship between a country’s political conditions and its oil 
production in several steps, first presenting our basic results on political conditions and volatility, 
then describing our approach to dealing with the possible endogeneity of political conditions, 
next testing the empirical relationship using several additional political conditions measures, and 
finally presenting several alternative specifications that evaluate whether other macro factors 
influence volatility in addition to political institutions.  We also show results suggesting that 
political conditions influence the share of a country’s reserves that are extracted, although we 
place less emphasis on these results since reserve estimates could be misleading.  Table 1 
provides summary statistics on all of the variables used in the analysis.  
  Our basic regression is of the form: 
(16)  i 1 i 1 1 i PC V η + + β + α = γ Xi  
where  i V  is a measure of oil volatility in country i, PCi is a measure of political conditions, Xi is 
a vector of control variables included in some specifications and  i η  is a random error.  We 
estimate equation (16) across the 48 major oil-producing countries.  All of our specifications are   12
weighted by a country’s average production within the appropriate time period, although the 
basic results are not sensitive to this weighting. 
Our base measure of political conditions is the Composite Democracy Index from the 
2007 Polity IV Project.
12  The composite score is defined as the difference between the 
Institutionalized Democracy index (DEMOCit) and the Institutionalized Autocracy index 
(AUTOCit).  The former index is based on the competitiveness and openness of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness of political participation.  
The index ranges from zero to ten.  The autocracy index is based on other measures of 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and 
competitiveness and regulation of political participation.  It also ranges from zero to ten.  The 
resulting combined polity score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 strongly democratic. 
For use in our index decompositions in Section IV, we rescale the index to range from 1 to 21 
with higher values still indicating stronger democratic tendencies.  Country-level oil production 
data is from BP (2009). 
A.  Basic Results 
  Table 2 presents versions of equation (16) estimated over two different time periods and 
without covariates.  We use data from both 1965-2007, where the start date is constrained by the 
availability of the oil production data, and 1980-2007, where the start date is constrained by the 
availability of data on oil reserves, used in later rows of the table.  Other work on political 
institutions has begun with the 1970s to ensure that the countries are independent nation states 
throughout the entire period of analysis (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen, 2003). 
  The results in the first row suggest that countries with higher polity scores have lower 
volatility, and the coefficient estimate is similar across the two different time periods.  
Considering the specification in the left-hand column, the magnitude of the coefficient on polity 
suggests that moving a country from the 25
th percentile polity score of 4.1 (e.g., Libya or 
Vietnam) to the 75
th percentile polity of 16.4 (e.g., Thailand or Ecuador), should reduce 
production volatility by .084, which represents approximately half a standard-deviation change 
in volatility.  Also, the R
2 in that specification suggests that political conditions explain nearly 
one fifth of the volatility differences across countries.  Figure 1 plots the data used to generate 
                                                 
12   The Polity IV data are described in detail in Marshall and Jaggers (2009) and are available on-line at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm.   13
this set of results, where the size of each circle is proportional to the country’s average 
production over the sample period. 
We also measure volatility in oil production after controlling for changes in underlying 
market conditions.  For example, if a country’s oil production increases dramatically over the 
span of several years because of the discovery of new oil reserves, this would be considered 
appropriate, economically-motivated volatility.  Similarly, profit-maximizing firms within a 
democratic country may cut back on production if world demand declines. 
To separate the “excess” volatility from the market-driven changes in oil production, we 
consider the following formula: 
 (17)  ln(Qit) = f(Sit,Dit) + g(PCit) 
where Qit represents country i’s production in year t, f(Sit, Dit) reflects output driven by both 
supply (S) and demand (D) factors, g(PCit) captures the influence of political conditions (PC) on 
output 
We estimate  ( ) () it it D , S f ˆ Q ˆ ln
it =  and then calculate the residual production: 
()( )( ) it it it Q ˆ ln Q ln PC g ˆ − = .  Our country-level measure of volatility is then: 
 (18)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 it it
1
i PC g ˆ PC g ˆ . dev . std V − − =  
  The second row of Table 2 reflects a specification where f() is a country-specific 
quadratic time trend.  At the country level, scientists have suggested that production will increase 
slowly at first, then more quickly and eventually decline (Hubbert (1956)).  Because some 
countries began extracting oil long before the beginning of our dataset while others began during 
our dataset, we are concerned that the volatility measure might reflect changes in output driven 
by petroleum engineering factors, as countries with recent oil discoveries would go through both 
the slow and rapid increase in our data set.   The results in the second row suggest that 
controlling for this possibility, the relationship between polity and volatility is even stronger, 
and, in the 1981-2007 time period accounts for almost half of the variation in volatility.
13 
The third and fourth rows of Table 2 estimate f() using information on world GDP, which 
affects world oil demand, and a country’s reserves, which, as an abstraction, we take to be 
                                                 
13 These results do not appear to reflect over-differencing as they are very similar to results using the standard 
deviation of the residuals from the quadratic trend as opposed to the difference in the residuals.   14
exogenous determinants of the country’s ability to produce oil.
14  The reported specifications 
reflect a coefficient of one on both ln(World GDP) and ln(Reserves), although the results are 
quantitatively very similar if we impose different coefficients on either variable.
15  In both rows, 
the absolute value of the coefficient on polity declines, but remains statistically significant at the 
five-percent level. 
Finally, the last row of Table 2 reports coefficient estimates that use a dependent variable 
measuring the largest single percent decline in annual production.    The results similarly suggest 
that countries with poor political conditions are more prone to large output drops.  In the 
regressions that follow, we will report results based on the volatility measure used in the first 
row of Table 2, although our results are not sensitive to this decision.  
B.  Reverse Causality 
  We argued in section II that our polity measure is likely endogenous and possibly 
correlated with the error term in regression equation (16).  In Table 3 we report results using 
several different instruments, all of which are based on the assumption that activities which took 
place before oil was commercialized in a country will reflect institutions independent of oil.  The 
results in the second column use the polity measure before known commercialization, where we 
use a broad definition of known commercialization, dating it as the first year we see oil 
production in our data base unless we were able to find evidence of earlier commercialization 
online and in Alexeev and Conrad (2009).  The results in column three use a narrower definition, 
dating commercialization based only on outside sources.  The results in column four use the 
settler mortality measure developed by AJR.
16 
  The pre-commercialization instruments are valid if the polity measures are persistent over 
time.  In that case, the instruments will be correlated with the time-persistent components of the 
polity measures while post-commercialization impacts of oil on polity are uncorrelated with the 
instruments.
   AJR argue that settler mortality correlates with settlement patterns in European 
                                                 
14 We have also estimated specifications using Kilian (2009)’s real demand variable, as he argues that it is a much 
better predictor of commodity demands than world GDP.  The coefficient on polity was slightly smaller in absolute 
value, although still precisely estimated to be different from zero. 
15 The equation we estimate is a reduced form of the supply and demand equations under certain assumptions about 
the relationship between income, supply and demand elasticities. 
16 Specifically, our instruments are the log of the settler mortality rate from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) and a dummy variable for European countries (for whom we assume that the log of settler mortality is zero).  
Based on Albouy (2009), we have estimated specifications omitting the nine countries in our data for which 
mortality estimates were based on soldiers on campaign, and our results are very similar.  The 2SLS coefficient on 
polity is -.0124 (standard error = .0057).   15
colonies and the subsequent political institutions that developed.
17  In all cases, the first-stage 
coefficients take the expected sign (positive for pre-commercialization polity and negative for 
settler mortality) and the F-statistics suggests that the instruments have good explanatory power. 
All three instruments are only available for a subset of our countries.  With the settler 
mortality instruments, we are mainly missing information from the Middle Eastern countries, 
which account for ten of the fourteen that are missing.  The broad polity variable is missing for 
Indonesia and Qatar, while the strict polity information is missing primarily for African and 
Asian countries.  OLS results based on the same subset of the data are reported in the panel 
below the 2SLS results. 
  When we use the broad pre-commercialization polity instruments, the two-stage least 
squares result suggests a smaller impact of polity on volatility compared to the equivalent OLS 
specification.  This could reflect a resource curse phenomenon if higher exogenous volatility in 
oil production facilitates more autocratic governments, perhaps because an autocrat is better able 
to smooth oil revenues over boom and bust periods.  By contrast, when we use the settler 
mortality instrument, the coefficient estimate more than doubles compared to the OLS 
specification.  This could reflect persistent measurement error in the polity measure.
18  In all 
three cases, the 2SLS coefficient estimate is negative, and it is statistically significant at the ten 
percent level or better for the two more precisely estimated instruments. 
C.  Alternative Political Conditions Measures 
  A similar story emerges when the polity variable is replaced by other measures of a 
country’s internal political conditions.  We consider four additional measures: 
Freedom House Political Rights (PRit): Freedom House ranks countries on a variety of scales 
including political rights and civil liberties (next index).  We use data from the 2008 Freedom 
House Survey.
19  The political rights index is based on a checklist of ten questions that is 
converted to a seven point scale ranging from 1 (most political rights) to 7 (fewest political 
rights).  For consistency with our other measures, we rescale the index to range from 1 (fewest 
political rights) to 7 (most political rights). 
                                                 
17   Du (2010) provides empirical support for this instrument in an analysis of currency and real economic crises. 
18 The analyses of the effects of institutions on macroeconomic conditions generally find that instrumenting for 
institutions increases their importance, which they interpret as evidence of measurement error (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001)). 
19   This database is available on-line along with a description of the methodology at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2008.   16
Freedom House Civil Liberties (CLit):  Based on the answers to fifteen questions, a score 
between 1 (most civil liberties) and 7 (fewest civil liberties) is awarded.  As with the civil 
liberties index, we rescale the index to range from 1 (fewer civil liberties) to 7 (most civil 
liberties). 
ICRG Expropriation Risks: Finally, we use the two expropriation measures used in previous 
macroeconomic work on institutions.  The first, capturing the risk of expropriation in a country 
between 1982 and 1995, was used by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), while the 
second composite index was used by Hall and Jones (1999).   
Results are reported in Table 4.  Each panel of the table reports univariate OLS and 2SLS 
specifications, equivalent to both the upper and lower panels of the second column of Table 3.  
The results for both of the Freedom House variables are very similar to those in Table 3, 
suggesting a negative relationship between production volatility and internal conditions in both 
the OLS and 2SLS specifications, and all results are statistically significant at the ten percent 
level except for the 2SLS specification for the Freedom House Political Rights variable, which is 
significant at the 11% level.
20  In fact, even though the Freedom House and polity variables are 
constructed using different methodologies, they are highly correlated (σFH Civil Liberties – Polity = 0.95 
σFH Civil Liberties – Polity =  0.92). 
  Both ICRG measures are negatively and statistically significant predictors of oil 
production volatility, and this holds for both the OLS and 2SLS specifications.   
For three of the four measures, the estimated coefficients in the 2SLS regression are 
smaller in absolute value than the OLS coefficients.  The ICRG risk of expropriation is the one 
exception to this pattern.   The first-stage coefficients are positive and significant in all four 
cases, although the F-statistic suggests weak explanatory power using the ICRG risk of 
expropriation. 
D. Additional  Covariates 
Table 5 reports results that include variables that capture cross-country differences in 
additional, nonpolitical, determinants of development. Our objective is to discern whether the 
strong relationship between political conditions and oil market volatility is mainly capturing an 
intermediate relationship between political conditions and another factor, such as financial 
                                                 
20 We also estimated 2SLS specifications using the settler mortality variable as an instrument.  The second stage 
coefficient estimates, equivalent to the four reported in Table 4, were all statistically significantly negative, although 
the instrument is weak, with first-stage F-statistics below 7 in all specifications.   17
openness.  We do this by estimating versions of equation (16) that include several additional 
covariates described more fully below (represented by Add. Cov.i below). 
(19)  i 2 i 2 i 2 2 i . Cov . Add PC V ν + + δ + β + α = γ Xi . 
If there is an intermediate relationship between political conditions and the additional covariate, 
then β1 from equation (16) will reflect both the direct effect of political conditions on volatility 
and the indirect effect, working through the covariate.  Equation (19) will separately identify the 
direct effect, so if β2 approximately equals β1 from equation (16), this suggests that the 
relationship we have picked up so far is not due to an intermediate effect of political conditions 
on the additional covariate. 
Panels A through D use Polity, Freedom House Political Rights, Freedom House Civil 
Liberties and the ICRG Composite Index, respectively.  Each column in a panel reports results 
from a separate specification.  All specifications include a control for the land area in a country 
(square miles) on the hypothesis that larger countries may be able to diversify production across 
sites and so control volatility.  This hypothesis bears out as countries with larger land area appear 
to experience less production volatility.  To save space, we do not report the coefficient on the 
land area variable, but in all specifications, it is negative and statistically significant at the five 
percent level or higher.
21  The economic impact is small, though, as the coefficient suggests that 
volatility falls by one-fifth of a standard deviation in countries with four million square miles 
more land area, which is more than a one standard deviation change in land area among our 
countries.  The first columns in Panels A-D, based on the same time period as the specification in 
the first row of the left-hand column of Table 2, only include the land area variable, and are 
included for purposes of comparison to the rest of the table. 
In the second column, we report results that include a measure of the country’s financial 
openness: its gross stock of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP.
22  We include this 
variable to test the hypothesis that political institutions affect firms’ ability to produce efficiently 
at least in part by altering their access to foreign capital.
23  Also, previous work has pointed to 
the importance of financial openness at the industry level.  For example, Rajan and Zingales 
                                                 
21 The reported coefficients in Table 5 are not sensitive to the inclusion of land area. 
22 The data are described in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), and Kose et al. (2006) summarize the pros and cons of 
different financial openness measures.  We have tried other variables, such as the Chinn-Ito Index (see Chinn and Ito 
(2006), and they are similarly insignificant. 
23  The literature on the relationship between financial openness and growth has recognized the potential relationship 
between political conditions and financial institutions (see, e.g., Eichengreen, Gullapalli and Panizza (2009)).   18
(1998) show that manufacturing industries that are more dependent on external finance grow 
disproportionately faster in countries that are financially open.  While that paper’s focus on 
manufacturing startups may appear irrelevant to the oil extraction industry, startups may provide 
many valuable support services to established oil extraction firms. 
If political institutions affect oil market outcomes by influencing the degree of financial 
openness, we would expect the coefficient on financial openness to be negative and the 
coefficient on polity to fall in absolute value.  In fact, in all four panels, the coefficient on the 
financial openness measure is positive, suggesting that countries with more financial openness 
are more volatile.  It is not significant at conventional levels, and the coefficient on the polity 
variable is attenuated, but not appreciably so.  The raw correlation between polity and financial 
openness for our countries is -.076.  This result could reflect the fact that even in countries with 
considerable capital flows, foreign investment in the oil industry is limited.  It may also simply 
reflect the fact that countries with considerable oil wealth are diversifying by investing abroad 
(e.g., Saudi Arabia and other major Arab oil and gas producing states), which makes them appear 
more financially open. 
The next set of specifications includes a dummy variable for countries that are in OPEC 
over the entire time period.  Political conditions could drive OPEC membership, as, for instance, 
countries with institutions that support strong antitrust laws will not be in the cartel.  Including 
the dummy also helps us assess whether the results in the first column are simply identifying 
differences between the large OPEC countries and the rest of the world or, alternatively, whether 
polity scores have an effect on production volatility even within OPEC and non-OPEC 
countries.
24 
  In principle, it is not clear what the sign of the OPEC dummy would be, as OPEC 
membership could provide production discipline that reduces volatility.  On the other hand, 
OPEC countries may adjust production to achieve price or profit goals in ways that could 
contribute to increased production volatility.  In general, OPEC membership seems to be 
associated with high volatility, although the coefficient on the dummy is only significant in one 
specification.  The coefficients on the political conditions variables are generally attenuated, 
suggesting that our results reflect, in part, the fact that countries with poor political conditions 
                                                 
24 We have also estimated specifications that allow for a quadratic relationship between polity and volatility and 
found little evidence of important nonlinearities.   19
are in OPEC, but the coefficients on the political conditions variables are still negative, and 
significantly so in the case of polity, even with the OPEC dummy. 
We also included an indicator variable for countries in which there were overt 
nationalization acts in the oil sector.  Specifically, Guriev, Kolotilin and Solin (2009) compiled a 
list of countries where there were, “forced divestments of foreign property,” [p. 12].   Their paper 
investigates determinants of these nationalization acts, including political institutions.  Our 
results suggest that countries that have had overt nationalizations have more volatile oil 
production, although the coefficients on the nationalization variable are never statistically 
significant.  The coefficient estimates on the political conditions variables are all smaller in 
absolute value, but, at least in the case of polity, still statistically significant.  This suggests that 
nationalizations do impact volatility, but that political conditions appear to work through 
additional channels as well.
25 
  The fourth column includes a country’s average GDP per capita between 1965 and 2007.  
As we have discussed, previous work has found a strong, causal relationship between political 
conditions and economic development levels, as measured by GDP per capita, among other 
things.  This appears true for the oil-producing countries in our data.  For instance, the raw 
correlation between the political conditions variables and GDP per capita is strongly positive: 
0.47 for polity, 0.59 for Freedom House Civil Liberties, 0.65 for Freedom House Political Rights 
and 0.76 for ICRG Composite Index. In the specifications in Panels B-D (which measure 
political conditions using Freedom House Political Rights, Freedom House Civil Liberties and 
the ICRG Composite Index), the coefficients on the political conditions variable are slightly 
larger in absolute value and remain statistically significantly negative.  Contrary to expectations, 
the coefficient on GDP per capita is positive, though quite imprecisely estimated.   
  The results for the polity variable, on the other hand, accord with expectations.  The 
coefficient on GDP is negative, though imprecisely estimated, and the coefficient on polity falls 
slightly in absolute value.  This result suggests that, at least for polity, some of the same factors 
that hinder economic development contribute to higher oil market volatility.  Taken together, the 
                                                 
25 In unreported specifications, we also included a variable to measure the presence of a national oil company 
(NOC).  An NOC may produce oil with more year-to-year volatility because it is constrained to pursue nonmarket 
objectives (Jaffee 2007).  The coefficient on this variable was very imprecisely estimated in all specifications, 
although this is not altogether surprising since over our time period, all but four of the countries in our sample 
(Australia, Denmark, United Kingdom, and United States) had NOCs.  This result is consistent with the idea that 
NOCs behave very differently depending on the political institutions within which they are operating.    20
result in Panels A-D indicate that political conditions affect production volatility after controlling 
for the country's development level (as measured by per capita GDP).  This buttresses the 
conclusion that political conditions can have real effects on production decisions in a particular 
market. 
Finally, we include a variable to measure countries’ legal environments.  These 
specifications are not directly analogous to the others in Table 5, as political conditions and legal 
environments are generally believed to arise independently.  Previous work has evaluated 
“property rights institutions”, which protect citizens from governments (and are generally 
measured by our political conditions variables), and contracting institutions, which facilitate 
commercial transactions between citizens, as competing explanations for different economic 
development levels.  Measures of contracting institutions include variables such as the number of 
legal procedures required to settle the collection on an overdue payment.
26  La Porta et al. (1998) 
show that countries in which the legal system derives from the French (civil-law) tradition have 
weaker contracting institutions (e.g., higher number of procedures) than countries with legal 
systems derived from the English (common law) tradition.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show 
that contracting institutions matter little for macroeconomic growth once differences in political 
institutions are accounted for.  We find a similar result for oil production volatility.
27 
E. Alternative  Specifications 
  The regressions reported above use average political conditions measures over the 
sample, so the coefficients are identified by cross-country differences in political conditions.  
Our instruments pick up only those components of political conditions which were pre-
determined before oil was a major factor in a country’s economy, but our exclusion restriction 
will be violated if there is an omitted variable correlated both with poor political conditions and 
volatile production.  For instance, if there is something about dominant religious institutions in a 
country that leads both to strong, unchecked executives and to volatility in production, our 
results cannot be interpreted causally.  In this section, we focus on variation in the political 
measure as the source of instability in oil production. 
We estimated several specifications similar to those reported in Tables 2 through 5 using 
the variance in polity over our time period as the explanatory variable of interest.  The 
                                                 
26 Our variable “World Bank Procedure Count” is from World Bank (2004). 
27 We have also estimated 2SLS specifications, using pre-oil commercialization political conditions and legal origins 
as instruments, and the results are very similar to those reported.   21
coefficients, except for the univariate OLS specification, are all positive. All coefficients are 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Positive coefficients, suggesting countries with more 
volatile political conditions have more volatile production, are generally consistent with the 
conclusions suggested by our previous results. 
An alternative specification replaces the polity measure with the change in polity defined 
as the difference between the average value across the last third of a country’s observations and 
the average of the first third of observations.  The production volatility measures are also re-
defined as the difference between the volatility for the last third of a country’s observations and 
the first third of observations.  The results are small and indistinguishable from zero.  In sum, 
there appears to be too little variation in polity scores within countries over time to identify the 
role of changes in political conditions on oil production volatility. 
F.  Political Conditions and Other Oil Production Outcomes 
Overall, our cross-sectional results suggest a robust causal relationship between political 
conditions and oil production volatility.  To further explore the role of political institutions, 
Table 6 reports results from a specification where we examined the volatility in the number of 
wells in a country.  The coefficients on polity suggest that the number of wells is also more 
volatile in countries with poor political conditions, consistent with the hypothesis that poor 
political conditions impact infrastructure investment and supply decisions.  Put differently, this 
helps confirm that the results in Tables 2 through 5 do not reflect a spurious correlation between 
physical or other determinants of oil production and political institutions, but instead can be 
interpreted causally.  The 2SLS results are nearly twice the magnitude of the OLS estimates, 
consistent with the presence of measurement error in the polity measure, and the results are 
statistically significant at the one percent level.
28 
 The results in Table 7 speak to whether political conditions affect not just the volatility 
of oil production but also the absolute level.  We consider the mean of production as a share of 
total reserves by country, under the theory that reserves are exogenous to political conditions and 
mainly reflect a country’s natural oil endowment.  The coefficient on polity is positive, 
suggesting that countries with good political conditions are extracting a greater share of their 
total reserves over the time period we examine. This could reflect a number of factors.  For 
instance, it could reflect profit-maximizing withholding by monopoly state-owned oil companies 
                                                 
28 Specifications including the OPEC dummy are very similar to those reported in Table 6.   22
in low polity countries, although the result is robust to the inclusion of the OPEC dummy 
variable.  The results are also robust to instrumenting for political conditions.  While in no way 
dispositive, the result is consistent with the hypothesis that poor political conditions impede 
production. 
IV. Implications 
Having documented the importance of a country’s political conditions to its oil 
production, we explore how changes in average political conditions of oil producing countries 
affect price volatility in world oil markets.  This allows us to explore whether the results we find 
at the micro level aggregate up to the macro level.  It also allows us to analyze the impacts on 
volatility of changes in political conditions within countries versus changes across countries in 
world production shares. 
                To conduct this analysis we construct several indexes of the political conditions of oil-
producing countries over the past several decades.  In all cases we construct a political conditions 
measure according to the following formula (where Iit represents one of the political conditions 
measures described in the previous section for country i in year t and  t Π  is a global index based 
on the underlying measure):   
(20)  ∑ = Π
i
it it t I ω  
it ω  is the share of country i's oil production in world production for year t.  We normalize all of 
the indexes by dividing by the value in the first year that the index is available.  The oil 
conditions index,  t Π , is a convenient measure of the average political conditions in oil-
producing countries weighted by production. 
Figure 2 plots the various indexes over time.  The polity index begins in 1965, when the 
oil data are first available, while the Freedom House and ICRG indexes are constrained by data 
on the political conditions.  Consider first the polity measure in the upper left corner of the 
figure.  The index is initially deteriorating, falling from its 1965 value by 30 percent before 
bottoming out in the late 1970s.  It then rises, peaking in the early 2000s about 10 percent higher 
than its 1965 level before beginning to deteriorate again.  A similar picture emerges from the 
Freedom House indexes (note that these indexes starts seven years later).  Both ICRG indexes 
rise through the 1980s and 1990s and then show signs of leveling off or even declining in early 
2000.   23
A.  Changes in Production Shares versus Changes in Internal Conditions  
  What explains the changes in the various indexes?  Log differentiation of equation (20) 
yields: 
(21)  ( ) ( ) ∑ ∑∑



















S = ˆ ).  Changes in the oil index can be 
decomposed into changes in underlying country conditions and changes in countries' shares of 
world oil production following the work of Boyd and Roop (2004) and Metcalf (2008).  Using a 
Fisher perfect decomposition, we decompose the oil index ( t Π ) into an internal-conditions index 
(
Pol
t Π ~ ) and production-share index (
od
t
Pr ~ Π ).  The internal-conditions index, 
Pol
t Π ~ , measures the 
change in the oil index holding the world oil production shares constant.
29  It thus isolates the 
importance of political changes in oil producing countries.  The oil production share index, 
od
t
Pr ~ Π , on the other hand, measures the change in the political conditions index holding country-
specific political conditions constant.  This index isolates the changes in world production and 
their contribution to the overall index.  These indexes (known as Fisher Ideal Indexes) have the 
desirable property of perfect decomposition.  This means that the oil index can be decomposed 






Pr ~ ~ Π Π = Π  
  Figure 3 reproduces the three indexes available over the longest time periods (in blue) 
and plots each against its two components.  Consider the upper left graph on Figure 3 where oil 
conditions are measured using the polity index.  The upper gray line with squares is the internal 
conditions index, 
Pol
t Π ~ , while the other gray line, which is below the overall index in the later 
years, is the production share index, 
od
t
Pr ~ Π .  Between 1965 and 1987 changes in the production 
share index drive changes in the overall index.  In the first decade oil is increasingly produced by 
countries with poor political conditions measures.  This partly reflects the growing share of 
OPEC and the USSR (share of world oil production rising from 61 percent in 1965 to 69 percent 
in 1976) and the declining share of the United States (26 percent to 14 percent over the same 
                                                 
29   We describe the construction of the Fisher indexes in the appendix.   24
period).  Over the next decade OPEC's share of world oil production dropped from 51 percent in 
1976 to 28 percent in 1985.  This followed the expansion in non-OPEC oil production following 
the two oil shocks of the 1970s, in particular the development of North Sea oil (rising to a world 
share of 6 percent by 1985) and a rebound in the US share of world oil production. 
  For the next twenty years changes in the production shares of world oil played little role 
in the steady rise in the overall index.  Rather a transformation of the world political order 
occurred.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev introduced democratization efforts leading up 
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  Also, Mexico’s polity score increased in 1988, 
when it held its first election with a serious opposition candidate in many years. 
  The decline in the oil index that began in 2003 can be explained roughly equally by 
declines in the internal conditions index and the oil production index.   In sum, the oil index 
constructed from the polity measure first declines and then rises to a peak in the early 2000's 
before starting to decline again.  Changes in the index are driven over the first half of the data by 
changes in the oil production share index.  The internal conditions index drives changes for most 
of the second half of the sample. 
  A similar story holds for the Freedom House political rights index.  Changes in both the 
internal conditions and the production share indexes appear to contribute to changes in the 
overall index prior to the mid-1980s.   After that year the influence of the internal conditions 
index dominates until the early 2000's.  Similarly the Freedom House civil liberties index shows 
a mixture of influences.  The internal conditions index appears to dominate from roughly 1985 to 
the early 2000's and the production share index dominates in the last several years.   
  In sum, the data suggest that there has been considerable variation over the past forty 
years in the political structure of oil producing countries.  That change has been driven at times 
by changes in the political structure within oil producing countries and at other times by changes 
in production shares across countries. 
B.  Political Conditions and Macroeconomic Indicators 
  A natural question to ask is whether the changes over time in the weighted-average 
political condition have impacted world oil markets.  For instance, we might suspect that as 
production moves away from countries with poor political conditions, which we demonstrated in 
the previous section had more volatile production, volatility in prices would decline. Table 8 
reports results from simple time series regressions which use two of the three indexes depicted in   25
the upper left panel of Figure 3, decomposing the polity measure, to predict oil price volatility.
30  
We measure oil price volatility in two ways.  In the first and third columns, we measure the 
within-year variance in the spot price (using data from the Global Financial Database, 
Commodity Price series).  As spot prices are only really meaningful beginning in the early 
1980s, we use data from the last 25 years of our sample (1983-2007).  In the second and fourth 
columns, we measure price volatility using the absolute value of the difference between the oil 
forward contract closing price traded three-months prior to delivery minus the delivery date’s 
closing spot price.  (The last daily trade in a month is used as the monthly observation of spot 
price and as the contract delivery date.)  This measure will capture unexpected changes in the 
market over the short run, which could be driven by supply-side disruptions caused by the 
political conditions in the oil-producing countries. 
  The top panel of Table 8 uses the overall political conditions index as the independent 
variable, and the bottom panel uses the production share index as the independent variable.  The 
results at the top of the table suggest that there is little, or if anything positive, correlation 
between the overall polity index and price volatility, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis.  
The results at the bottom without a trend suggest a distinct negative effect of increasing the 
production share index on price volatility.  The coefficient estimates fall and become statistically 
insignificant when we add a linear trend, although with only 25 observations over time, it may be 
too difficult to detect a relationship based on deviations around a trend.  Overall, the results may 
suggest that it takes time before short-run changes in political conditions impact oil production in 
a country, but that shifts in production to countries with long histories of good governance will 
lead to lower price volatility. 
C.  Interpreting Our Results 
  We have presented a theoretical model that suggests a link between political conditions in 
a country and the stability of the country's oil production.  Empirical evidence suggests that more 
democratic countries have more stable production over time.  Moreover our preferred political 
conditions index of oil supply suggests a recent downturn in polity among oil producing nations.   
  One should not, however, interpret our results as suggesting a new rationale for 
government intervention in energy markets to promote energy security.  For example, it would 
                                                 
30 Although the indexes are not additive, the results for the third index were similar to the linear combination of the 
other two indexes, so we report results using only two of the three indexes.   26
be incorrect to interpret our results as supporting a policy of more domestic supply to reduce oil 
imports.  We say this first because supply shocks of the sort that we investigate in this paper – 
country-specific and largely idiosyncratic shocks – can in general be quickly replaced in world 
markets by other suppliers.  Thus price shocks are for the most part short-lived.
31  Second, oil is 
a fungible commodity and price shocks arising from a supply shortfall anywhere in the world 
affects all oil consumers regardless of the source of their particular oil.  As noted by Deutch and 
Schlesinger (2006) and the National Research Council (2009), among others, a country's 
vulnerability to oil shocks depends on its consumption of oil relative to the size of its economy 
rather than its imports. 
  The results do enhance our understanding of the relationship between political 
governance and energy supply and more generally of the connections between political 
institutions and economic performance.  In that vein, our paper can be viewed as a contribution 
towards opening up Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson's "black box" to see an example where 
governance affects the workings of a particular market, one that happens to be of particular 
importance to the world economy. 
V. Conclusion 
  We have analyzed how political conditions in oil producing countries affect the volatility 
of oil production as well as other oil market outcomes.  We show that there is a pronounced 
negative relationship between the short-run volatility in oil production in a country and its 
political openness, with very democratic regimes exhibiting less volatility in their oil production 
than more autocratic regimes.  This result holds across several robustness checks including using 
different measures of political conditions, instrumenting for political conditions and using 
different measures of oil production volatility. 
We next document that the average political conditions of oil producing countries has 
changed markedly over the past thirty-five to forty years.  Using the polity composite democracy 
index, for example, we find that our oil index falls by 30 percent between 1965 and 1976 and 
then nearly doubles over the next twenty-eight years.  Over the past five years it has fallen by 
roughly five percent.  We then decompose that index into a political index that controls for the 
distribution of oil production across countries and a production share index that controls for the 
                                                 
31  This is not to suggest that idiosyncratic supply shocks are entirely unimportant.  They can contribute to an 
atmosphere of concern about supply that feeds into a precautionary demand shock as described by Kilian (2008).   27
political structure of producing countries.  Again using the polity measure, early changes in our 
oil security index are driven by the distribution of countries producing oil while latter changes 
are driven more by changes in political conditions within producing countries. 
  One should be cautious in drawing policy recommendations from this finding.  It does 
suggest that a research agenda focusing on the role of political institutions in affecting global 
energy markets is a fruitful one.  This paper takes a reduced form approach.  Subsequent research 
will be important to begin to understand the mechanisms that affect supply volatility and what 
the implications are for policy.  Also, our index measures could be used to analyze the potential 
risks associated with different renewable energy technologies, many of which (for instance, solar 
electricity and electric vehicles) rely on natural resources that are available in a limited set of 
countries.   28
Appendix (Not for Publication).  Construction of the Fisher Political Conditions Indexes 
  We begin by constructing an index of oil security as a weighted average of country level 
security as measured by one of our political conditions measures weighted by oil production in 
that year.  The index is normalized to equal one in the first year.  We describe the process in 













The political conditions index based on the polity measure (Pit ) is denoted by  t Π  .  The 
numerator is the average in year t of the polity measure across countries in year t weighted by the 
share of country i's oil production in that year ( it ω  ).  To construct the Fisher Ideal index, we first 




































The Laspeyres political index fixes the oil production shares at their 1965 levels and allows the 
political conditions measure to change over time.  It thus measures changes in the political 
conditions index solely due to changes within countries.  The Laspeyres production index, on the 
contrary, measures changes in the political conditions index due to changes in each country's 
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The Laspeyres indexes use a base period fixed weight while the Paasche indexes uses a period t 















Pr Pr Pr ~ = Π . 
 
Fisher (1921) showed that his ideal index satisfied perfect decomposition of an expenditure 
index into a price and quantity index under conditions satisfied by our data.  In our context, a 
Fisher ideal index provides a perfect decomposition of an aggregate political conditions index 






Pr ~ ~ Π Π = Π  . 
 
 The other political conditions indexes are decomposed in a similar fashion where we simply 
substitute other country level political conditions measures for the polity measure used here.    30
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Years 
Covered 
Oil Production Volatility Measures                
Stdev[lnQt – lnQt-1] 0.191 0.163 0.029 1.001  1965-2007
Stdev[(lnQt – lnGDPt) – (lnQt-1 – lnGDPt-1)] 0.198 0.160 0.062 0.986  1965-2007
Stdev[lnQt – lnQt-1] 0.158 0.180 0.020 1.001  1980-2007
Stdev[(lnQt – lnGDPt) – (lnQt-1 – lnGDPt-1)] 0.169 0.175 0.051 0.986  1980-2007
Stdev[(lnQt – lnGDPt - lnReservest) –  
            (lnQt-1 – lnGDPt-1 – lnReservest-1)] 0.230  0.192  0.059  0.987  1980-2007
Largest one-year percentage decline  0.212 0.179 0.000 0.867  1965-2007
Largest one-year percentage decline  0.168  0.169  0.000  0.867  1980-2007
Volatility in Wells  0.221 0.209 0.000 0.896  1980-2006
Production/Reserves  0.061 0.035 0.007 0.175  1980-2007
Explanatory Variables                
Polity 10.0  7.0  1.0  21.0  1965-2007
1900 Polity Broad  8.9  7.2  1  21  See text 
1900 Polity Strict  7.4  6.7  1  21  “ 
Settler Mortality  3.1  2.3  0  7.6  “ 
Freedom House Political Rights  3.4  2.1  1.0  7.0  1972-2007
Freedom House Civil Liberties  3.6  1.8  1.0  7.0  1972-2007
ICRG Risk of Expropriation  7.5  1.5  2.5  9.9  1982-1997
ICRG composite index (aggregate of 5 
ICRG measures)  31.0 8.1  14.6  49.4  1982-1997
Financial Openness  1.3  1.0  0.3  5.8  1970-2007
OPEC Membership  0.2  0.4  0.0  1.0  1965-2007
Act of Nationalization  0.5  0.5  0.0  1.0  1960-2006
National Oil Company  0.9  0.3  0.0  1.0  1965-2007
Average GDP per Capita  5724  7683  328  30013  1965-2007
World Bank Procedure Count  27.2  11.9  11.0  54.0  2004 
Common Law Origins  0.3  0.4  0.0  1.0  NA 
Land Area (millions of square miles)  2.1  3.5  0.0  17.1  1965-2007
    
Source: Various (see text).   34
 Table 2. Volatility and Polity 












Stdev[lnQt – lnQt-1]  -0.0068*** 0.185  -0.0060**  0.175 
  (0.0023)     (0.0024)    
Stdev[(lnQt – β1 t – β2 t
2) –  
           (lnQt-1 β1 (t-1) – β2 (t-1)
2)]   -0.0068*** 0.207  -0.0062***  0.212 
  (0.0022)     (0.0023)    
Stdev[(lnQt – lnGDPt) –  
           (lnQt-1 – lnGDPt-1)]  -0.0052** 0.120  -0.0048**  0.122 
  (0.0023)     (0.0023)    
Stdev[(lnQt – lnGDPt - 
lnReservest) –  
        lnQt-1 – lnGDPt-1 – 
lnReservest-1)]  -0.0053** 0.113 
     
  (0.0026)          
Largest one-year percentage 
decline  -0.0118*** 0.249 
-0.0138*** 0.266 
  (0.0036)     (0.0038)    
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications are weighted by a country’s average production within the 
appropriate time period.  The first two columns present results where the dependent variable is estimated over the 
range 1981-2007, where the first year is one year after the data begins since the dependent variables are in first 
differences. The two right-most columns present results where the dependent variable is estimated over the data 
range 1966-2007.  N = 48, rows 1-3, 5; N=47, row 4 (data on reserves in Cameroon are not available). 
* - p-value less than 10 percent 
** - p-value less than 5 percent 
*** - p-value less than 1 percent 
   35
Table 3.  Volatility and Polity: Two-Stage Least Squares 
   2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
   1900 Polity (Broad)  1900 Polity (Strict) Settler  Mortality 
Polity  -0.0031 -0.0039*  -0.0120** 
   (0.0035) (0.0022)  (0.0054) 
First-
stage F-
statistic 48.66  61.26  11.05 
      
  OLS  OLS  OLS 
Polity  -0.0063** -0.0038*  -0.0034 
  (0.0025) (0.0018)  (0.0030) 
R
2 
0.186 .248  .075 
Obs  46 26  34 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications are weighted by a country’s average production between 
1965-2007. 
* - p-value less than 10 percent 
** - p-value less than 5 percent 
*** - p-value less than 1 percent   36
Table 4. Oil Production Volatility Regressions: Alternative Political Measures
   OLS 2SLS 
Freedom House 
Political Rights   -0.0169** -0.0150 
   (0.0081) (0.0091) 
R
2  0.114  
First-stage F-
statistic     63.06 
Freedom House 
Civil Liberties   -0.0188** -0.0154* 
   (0.0082) (0.0092) 
R
2  0.124  
First-stage  
F-statistic     68.14 
Risk of 
Expropriation  -0.0349* -0.0407** 
   (0.0175) (0.0186) 
R
2  0.175  
First-stage F-
statistic     4.89 
ICRG composite 
index   -0.0050** -0.0046** 
   (0.0024) (0.0022) 
R
2  0.120  
First-stage  
F-statistic     19.81 
 
N = 48 for OLS specifications (46 for last two measures).  N = 46 for 2SLS specifications (44 for last 
two measures).  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  The specifications for the first two alternative 
measures are weighted by a country’s average production between 1972 and 2007.  The specifications 
for the last two alternative measures are weighted by a country’s average production between 1982 and 
1997.  2SLS results use 1900 Polity (Broad) as the instrument.   37
Table 5. Volatility and Political Conditions with Additional Covariates 



























































































































































Land area is included in all specifications, but coefficient estimates are not shown.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses. All regressions are cross-sectional OLS with one observation per 
country. Each column in each panel reports results from a separate regression. N = 48 for all 
cells in Panels A-C (except 47 for the Financial Openness specifications).  N = 45 for Panel D 
(except 44 for the Financial Openness specification).   38
Table 6. Volatility in Oil Producing Wells and Polity 
   OLS  2SLS 
Polity -0.0116*  -0.0116*  -0.0204***  -0.0206*** 
   (0.0064)  (0.0066)  (0.0074)  (0.0076) 
Land Area     -0.0010     -0.0018 
      (0.0102)     (0.0075) 
R
2 0.251  0.252     
First Stage F-
Statistic        21.09  16.40 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications are weighted by a country’s 
average wells between 1980 and 2006.  Producing wells data from the Oil & Gas Journal 
Energy Database. Wells totals do not include shut in, injection, or service wells.  There are 
48 observations in the OLS regressions and 46 in the 2SLS regressions.  2SLS results use 
1900 Polity (Broad) as the instrument. 
 
* - p-value less than 10 percent 
** - p-value less than 5 percent 




Table 7. Oil Production as a Fraction of Reserves and Polity 
 OLS  2SLS 
Polity  0.0035*** 0.0020**  0.0042***  0.0030*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0007)  (0.0008) (0.0009) 
Land Area   -0.0004   -0.0003 
   (0.0010)   (0.0009) 
OPEC   -0.0424***   -0.0378*** 
   (0.0125)   (0.0146) 
R
2  0.457 0.622  0.463 0.653 
First Stage F-
Statistic     28.38  14.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications are weighted by a country’s 
average production between 1980 and 2007.  OLS regressions have 47 observations and the 
2SLS 46.  2SLS results use 1900 Polity (Broad) as the instrument. 
 
* - p-value less than 10 percent 
** - p-value less than 5 percent 
*** - p-value less than 1 percent 
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Polity Index  0.1526  9.147***  0.0027 -11.33 
   (0.0921)  (2.505)  (0.1456) (7.67) 
Trend     0.0021 0.2929** 
       (0.0019) (0.1083) 
 R
2   0.129  0.153  0.155 0.653 
Polity Production 





    (0.2728)  (17.91)  (0.6391) (16.99) 
Trend     0.0015 0.1332 
     (0.0025) (0.0343) 
R
2  0.056  0.405 0.161 0.600 
Regressions are run using data from 1983 through 2007 (25 observations).  Estimated 
using a Prais-Winsten transformation to adjust for the presence of serial correlation.  
* - p-value less than 10 percent 
** - p-value less than 5 percent 
*** - p-value less than 1 percent 
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                                                                                                             Figure 1 
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Figure 3.  Political Conditions Index Decompositions 
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